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In a two period overlapping generations model of endogenous longevity and economic
growth, individuals choose to invest in health and education. The investments are costly
in terms of foregone ﬁrst period consumption and the beneﬁt is in the second period
where health has the eﬀect of increasing the probability of survival, and education
investment will bring higher income. These investments are risky as survival through
period two, when the payoﬀs can be had, is not certain. Individuals with varying degrees
of risk aversion will choose the ordering in which they invest in health and education.
It is only when investment in education is achieved that an economy will experience
endogenous growth.
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1Endogenous Longevity and Economic Growth
1 Introduction
The relationship between life expectancy and economic growth is a newly contested
ﬁeld. Economic growth models that treat longevity as an exogenous parameter show
that an increase in life expectancy will increase the time horizon over which returns
to education can be realised, thereby encouraging investment in human capital and
driving endogenous growth. Existing models of endogenous life expectancy, where the
survival probability is a function of a choice variable within the model, also show this
same positive relationship between life expectancy and economic growth. Moreover,
models of endogenous longevity can explain a persistent low level of per capita income.
By making not only education levels a choice of the individual, but also allowing the
individual to invest in their health and inﬂuence their own life expectancy adds a new
dimension to the analysis as an individual has control over the level of investment in
the risky asset and also the probability of achieving that asset.
In this chapter, the relationship between health and education, and thus the nexus
with economic growth, is explored in detail. Investment in schooling has the eﬀect
of increasing income in the second period of life, but an individual will only live into
this period probabilistically. Thus lifetime income is state contingent — a person lives
through the second period or dies prematurely at the end of the ﬁrst period. If the
individual lives through the second period then they are able to enjoy the higher income
from skilled wages, but if they die they will have forgone current consumption to invest
in schooling and are not alive to enjoy the beneﬁt. Investment in education has the
eﬀect of increasing the return on the risky asset, but with health also a choice variable,
the individual can determine the probability of achieving the risky asset (second period
consumption). An individual will compare this ‘gamble’ with a position of certainty,
where investment in health and education remains at zero, when making decisions over
whether to invest in the two choice variables.
Investment in schooling is suﬃcient for long run growth to prevail even when the
productivity of human capital is low, however it is costly in terms of forgone ﬁrst period
2income and the individual will not invest in schooling unless the expected utility of this
investment is higher than the expected utility of zero investment in schooling. That
the individual has command over the probability of living through the second period
by investing in health, elucidates the eﬀects of variable life expectancy on investment
in schooling and thus economic growth. Understanding that with uncertain lifetimes
individuals make decisions with state contingent outcomes, in which they not only con-
trol how much to invest in the risky asset but also make a choice over the probability
of gaining the risky asset, sheds new light on our analysis of the incentives to invest in
health and education and their ﬂow on eﬀects to economic growth.
In a survey of the literature pertaining to demographic change and economic growth,
Ehrlich and Lui (1997) emphasise the next logical advancement is to develop models of
endogenous longevity. Although Grossman (1972), Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), Black-
burn and Cipriani (2002), Chakraborty (2004), Chakraborty and Das (2005) explore
some aspects of the dynamic characteristics of longevity and per capita income, the
relationship with fully endogenous longevity is not analysed systematically. This paper
aims to clarify the relationship between life expectancy and economic growth using a two
period overlapping generations model similar in form to that of Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002), Chakraborty (2004) and Chakraborty and Das (2005). The particular focus of
this paper is the interaction between health investment and schooling investment under
diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion and their roles in economic development.
This chapter is structured as follows, in the next section a brief review of the literature
on economic growth using exogenous life expectancy is given, followed by a more detailed
review of two of the key papers using endogenous life expectancy. The model used in this
chapter is then developed, and the ﬁrst order conditions lead to analysis of the corner
solutions in health and schooling investment, and the Euler equations are analysed in
the the context of a full interior solution with diﬀering degrees of risk aversion. The
payoﬀ between health and schooling investment is analysed by simulating the model.
Concluding comments are then made.
32 Models of Longevity and Growth
2.1 Exogenous Longevity
Theoretical models proposed by authors such as Zhang et al. (2001), de la Croix and Li-
candro (1999), Rosenzweig (1990), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000), Boucekkine et al. (1999),
Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) construct an overlapping generations model and demonstrate that
an exogenous increase in life expectancy lengthens the time horizon over which returns
to human capital investment can be earned, thereby inﬂuencing an increase in the latter.
The enhanced accumulation of human capital drives endogenous growth. However, their
analysis suﬀers from two limitations: the assumed direction of causality and neglect of
the role of costly investment in health and thus life expectancy.
In models of exogenous longevity the unidirectional causal link between life ex-
pectancy and income severely restricts the scope for analysis and policy application.
The imposition of this restrictive assumption regarding the causal direction leads to
the conclusion that a universal increase in life expectancy, by exogenously determined
means, will boost economic growth in all countries from low to high per capita income.
Here we argue that life expectancy may increase as a result of deliberate and costly
investment. Unlike other exogenous variables in these models, for example, the rate of
time preference, life expectancy is not a feature of an individual’s preferences, but is
achieved by way of the allocation of resources to goods and services that will enhance
the individual’s health and probability of survival. Investing in health increases the
probability of gaining utility over second period consumption. The source of these
resources can be government provision or private investment. Either avenue requires
individuals to forgo current consumption in favour of investment in health that will
enhance the probability of survival. To model investment in health and longevity, it
must be a choice variable with resource costs.
Incorporating the opportunity cost of investing in health (in addition to that of
schooling) into the lifetime consumption decision does not lead to the same policy con-
clusion as models of exogenous longevity, rather at low levels of income zero investment
in health can be optimal, and actively increasing investment in life extension may be
4sub-optimal. The model developed in this chapter explores in greater detail the inter-
action between life expectancy and economic growth by allowing for the endogeneity of
life expectancy, where health is a choice variable of the expected utility maximising in-
dividual. The individual makes the choice over investing in schooling to increase second
period consumption (the risky asset) or increasing the probability of achieving the risky
asset through investment in health.
2.2 Endogenous Longevity
Models of endogenous longevity are currently in their infancy, although they are increas-
ingly the focus of analysis relating demographic variables to economic growth. Seminal
works by Grossman (1972) and the more reﬁned paper by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990)
introduce the concept of the demand for health and longevity. The rigor of the Ehrlich
and Chuma (1990) paper is impressive, and the development of the value of health cap-
ital, that is lacking in models of exogenous longevity, is articulated convincingly. The
opportunity cost of forgone consumption for the provision of resources for investment
in health is identiﬁed in these two papers. Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) only brieﬂy dis-
cuss the relationship between endogenous longevity and economic growth (Ehrlich and
Chuma, 1990), the focus of their work is the demand for health rather than the dynamic
economic growth eﬀects.
The modelling framework adopted in the current paper extends works by Black-
burn and Cipriani (2002) and Chakraborty (2004) who attempt to model endogenous
longevity and economic growth. Both models feature endogenous growth driven by hu-
man capital accumulation; Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) augment their model with
variable labour supply and Chakraborty (2004) opts for augmentation with physical
capital accumulation. The Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) paper is used in developing
the core framework of this chapter where individuals are both consumers and producers.
In drawing on their foundation, the model in this chapter incorporates their production
functions for output and human capital accumulation.
Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Chakraborty (2004) endogenise longevity in dif-
ferent ways. Both are discrete time models, and analyse the endogeneity of the proba-
5bility of survival into the ﬁnal period of life. In Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), the life
expectancy of a child is pre-determined by the choice of human capital accumulation of
their parents. Chakraborty (2004) endogenises the probability of survival through an
optimally chosen health tax. The concept of an optimally chosen proportion of income
devoted to health as in Chakraborty (2004), is adopted in this chapter, although it is
treated as a matter of individual choice rather than public choice.
Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) ﬁnd in their model of development with dynamically
endogenous life expectancy, that a higher probability of survival is associated with a
higher steady state level of human capital, and potentially endogenous growth (Black-
burn and Cipriani, 2002, p. 194). The mechanism by which a higher life expectancy is
achieved is through a higher level of human capital investment by the parent, not of the
current utility maximising individual. Chakraborty (2004) also ﬁnds that a higher life
expectancy is associated with a faster rate of convergence from the same initial condi-
tions (other than life expectancy). The steady state level of income increases with the
increase in life expectancy and the economy is now further away from the steady state
and hence transitional dynamics dictate that the growth rate will be faster.
A feature of these two papers which endogenise life expectancy is the existence of
poverty traps, or economic stagnation. Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) show that if the
initial level of human capital is below the threshold level then the economy will stagnate,
and as life expectancy depends on the level of development of the economy, persistent
low income translates to a persistent low life expectancy. Economies that are above the
threshold of initial human capital stock experience endogenous growth and rising life
expectancy. Chakraborty (2004) explains that in their model, development traps are
possible, and in high mortality economies the incentive to invest (in physical or human
capital) is low, and hence growth stagnates.
Despite the merits of these two papers of endogenous longevity and economic growth,
they have serious drawbacks, and there is scope to develop the modelling. The Black-
burn and Cipriani (2002) paper’s use of parents’ human capital implies a dynamically
endogenous probability of survival, but life expectancy is not a control variable of the
utility maximising agent. As longevity is not a choice variable of the agent, parents’ util-
ity function remains additively separable (see Equation (1) in Blackburn and Cipriani,
62002) and a closed form solution is proposed. Ignoring the opportunity cost of extend-
ing life expectancy aﬀords a modelling simpliﬁcation, but restricts the value added of
this model over models of exogenous longevity. The diﬀerences between exogenous and
endogenous models of longevity are driven by the recognition of this opportunity cost,
and skirting this important aspect detracts from the value of endogenising longevity.
Chakraborty (2004) does address the opportunity cost of investment in health through
the health tax chosen optimally by the utility maximising individual (see Appendix B
Chakraborty, 2004). The fundamental problem with the analysis of Chakraborty (2004)
is that he does not utilise the endogeneity of the survival probability and the associated
opportunity cost to address key conclusions; rather, he conducts the analysis assuming
a ﬁxed health tax. In the development of Proposition 1 (see page 126), the discussion
reverts to endogenous longevity even though the preceding analysis was conducted as-
suming exogenous longevity. On closer inspection, this proposition pertaining to the
mechanism by which diﬀerences in productivity drive cross country diﬀerences in life
expectancy can be attained with exogenous longevity — endogeneity of longevity is not
required as is asserted by Chakraborty (2004). Appendix 1 of this chapter details this
criticism.
Each of the above models explores the relationship between endogenous longevity
and economic growth. The relationship between life expectancy, human capital ac-
cumulation, and endogenous life expectancy feature in all of these models. However,
the model in this chapter oﬀers a comparison of human capital investment and health
capital investment and the role each plays in their contribution to economic growth.
Moreover, decisions over these investments consider the individuals’ attitude towards
risk, as decisions are made under uncertainty.
3 A Model of Endogenous Longevity and
Economic Growth
In a two period overlapping generations model, the fertility rate is predetermined with
one child born to each individual at the end of period one, and the individual will max-
7imise their lifetime expected utility over consumption in the current and future periods.
In the ﬁrst period of life, the individual makes decisions over labour supply and invest-
ment in schooling, the latter contributes to the accumulation of the stock of human
capital. Consumption in this period is increasing in labour supply, but investment in
schooling will increase second period consumption. This investment, however, is con-
sidered risky as the individual will only survive into the second period probabilistically
depending on their health status. If the individual survives into the second period they
supply labour and are awarded a wage depending on their accumulated level of human
capital. Human capital accumulation is the engine of growth, and an economy can
stagnate if investment in schooling is non-existent or insuﬃcient.
The probability of survival into the second period is endogenised. In the ﬁrst period,
individuals not only make decisions over how much to invest in the risky investment
(schooling), but also how much to invest in health which determines the probability of
attaining the risky asset (period two consumption). From a situation where investment
in schooling and health is zero, which investment the individual will make ﬁrst (health
or schooling) will depend on the individual’s degree of risk aversion. For example, as
the simulation results show, an individual who is highly risk averse will ﬁrst invest in
health to increase the probability of a payoﬀ, before taking the gamble by investing in
schooling.
The model in this chapter extends the model of exogenous longevity above on two
fronts: ﬁrstly, and obviously, life expectancy is endogenous, and secondly, schooling is
split into a compulsory and voluntary level. The reason for the latter is to show that an
individual’s willingness to voluntarily invest in health, or schooling, will depend on the
degree of risk aversion. Without the compulsory schooling component this cannot be
determined as the marginal utility of schooling investment is inﬁnite at zero investment
if compulsory schooling is not in the model.
To summarise, the model is a two period overlapping generations model of endoge-
nous survival probability, and exogenous fertility, where economic growth is driven by
human capital accumulation. The individual aims to maximise their expected lifetime
utility over current and future consumption, and in the ﬁrst period of life, the individual
has the choice over current consumption, investment in schooling to raise second period
8consumption, and investment in health to increase survival probability1. In the second
period of life, the individual consumes all that is produced. Individuals make the choice
of investing in either health or schooling, both, or neither, depending on their degree of
risk aversion as income accumulates.
3.1 Expected Utility
Individuals born in period t maximise their expected lifetime utility over consumption
in the ﬁrst period of life, ct
t, and that in the second period, ct
t+1. The expected utility
















It is assumed that utility is increasing and concave in consumption, u′ (c) > 0 and
u′′ (c) < 0.
The probability of survival, πt+1, acts as an eﬀective discount rate, and is a choice
variable (via health investment, ht
t) within the individual’s maximisation problem. The
rate of time preference is set at zero in this example, and as this exogenous parame-
ter plays no role in the analysis, this assumption has no limiting consequences. Even
though the rate of time preference is set to zero, the individual is not strictly indiﬀerent
between consumption in the ﬁrst and second periods as survival through period two is
probabilistic, πt+1 ∈ (0,1). Survival through the ﬁrst period is certain and hence the
notation of πt = 1 could be included. To this end, this is a model of adult mortality.
A felicity function with a constant relative risk aversion has the properties required











, γ ∈ (0,1) (2)
Where γ = 1
σ. Being a model with uncertainty, the familiar constant intertemporal




2, where σ is the measure of risk aversion. An individual with constant relative
1The terms survival probability, longevity and life expectancy are used interchangeably.
2The measure of constant relative risk aversion, rR(ct+i,u) =
ct+iu
′′(c)
u′(c) = −γ is constant and not
inﬂuenced by the endogenous probability of survival.
9risk aversion (as opposed to increasing or decreasing) will have no greater willingness
to accept a gamble (invest in period two consumption) with an increase in wealth. The
higher is the relative risk aversion (the higher is γ, σ → 0), the more risk averse is
the individual and they will require a greater risk premium to encourage investment
in second period consumption where the length of time over which returns to such
investment is uncertain. A value of γ > 1 will yield a negative felicity function in
consumption, hence γ < 1 is assumed so that consumption has the intuitive eﬀect of
positive expected utility even at very low levels of consumption3. Note that γ = 0 gives
a risk neutral person, and as γ → 1 the degree of risk aversion increases. γ = 1 will give
a felicity function logarithmic in consumption.
3.2 Survival Function
The probability of survival, πt+1, is determined in part by the level of investment in
health as chosen by the individual in period one, ht, and in part by factors historically
determined or existing public health measures, ¯ z. The survival function has the following
properties:
πt+1 = π (ht, ¯ z); πt+1 (0, ¯ z) > 0; πt+1(∞,∞) ≤ 1
πh (ht, ¯ z) > 0; πz (ht, ¯ z) > 0; πhh (ht, ¯ z) < 0;
πh(0, ¯ z) ∈ (0,∞); πh(0,0) = ∞ (3)
There is a baseline probability of survival that is a function of an exogenously determined
level of health, ¯ z. Investment in health could be directed towards public goods such
as closed sewerage system, access to clean water or a public hospital system, or private
health beneﬁts such as private medical insurance, healthy food, and exercise, all of which
are assumed to increase life expectancy beyond the baseline level. Health investment,
ht, contributes positively to the probability of survival through the second period. An
individual lives with certainty through the ﬁrst period, and with probability πt+1 lives
3In this model of uncertainty, expected utility is interpreted as cardinal utility and not ordinal utility,
hence the value of utility matters. Moreover, in this OLG model the implicit expected utility of death
is zero, so when expected utility of consumption is negative then the individual will always prefer dying
to living no matter how high consumption is, if γ > 1, in this situation strictly positive investment in
health and schooling will never eventuate.
10into the second period, otherwise the individual dies with probability 1 − πt+1 at the
end of the ﬁrst period. Disinvestment in health, for example smoking cigarettes, is
not modelled here, but zero investment in health is a feasible decision of the utility
maximising individual. Note that the survival probability is not a function of education,
as is done in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002). Although it is reasonable to expect that
higher levels of education promote longevity, insofar as on average individuals who are
more highly educated have greater decision making capabilities over choices that include
life extending behaviour. However, in this model the role of education and health are
considered separate, and further extensions may include both health and education
investment (or stock) in the survival function.
3.3 Human Capital Accumulation and Transmission
In the ﬁrst period of life, individuals divide their time between compulsory schooling, ¯ s,
voluntary schooling, st, and labour supply. Schooling augments inherited human capital
in a multiplicative fashion, reﬂecting the hypothesis that the higher the level of initial
human capital, the greater the beneﬁt of schooling. Thus a person born in period t






t (st + ¯ s), B > 1 (4)
Human capital is linked across generations by the assumption that children are not only
born with a biological level of human capital, ¯ e, but they also inherit4 their parents’





t + ¯ e (5)
Equations (4) and (5) together describe the evolution of human capital as a ﬁrst order
diﬀerence equation which can be rewritten as,
e
t
t+1 = B(¯ s + st)e
t−1
t + B¯ e(¯ s + st) (6)
4This inheritance might be acquired through informal education in the home which is treated as
costless for the purpose of this paper.
11Being a linear autonomous ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation, Equation (6) solves to be,
et = ¯ e{
1 − 2B(st + ¯ s)
1 − B(st + ¯ s)
}{B(st + ¯ s)}
t +
B¯ e(st + ¯ s)
1 − B(st + ¯ s)
(7)
For endogenous growth, et must grow exponentially. For this to be such, restrictions on
the parameter values are required.
The economy will stagnate to the steady state of human capital if, B(st + ¯ s) < 1, in
which case the growth component of equation (7) will approach zero in the limit,
limt → ∞ {B(st + ¯ s)}
t = 0 if B(st + ¯ s) < 1 (8)
Endogenous growth requires,
B(st + ¯ s) > 1
which then ensures, ¯ e{
1 − 2B(st + ¯ s)
1 − B(st + ¯ s)
} > 0 (9)
High productivity of human capital in human capital production, B, must be coupled
with a high rate of schooling investment (voluntary or compulsory) to ensure that en-
dogenous growth ensues5.
3.4 Production Function
Output in each period, yt
T where T = t,t + 1, is a multiplicative function of inherited
human capital, et
T, labour supply, lt
T, and a productivity parameter, A. Per capita







T, where T=t, t+1 (10)
This is the same form adopted by Blackburn and Cipriani (2002). There is no physical
capital, and savings is in the form of schooling and it is the avenue by which income is
5The simulation results conducted later in the chapter indicate that it is the low productivity
of human capital in human capital reproduction that causes the poverty traps, not low compulsory
schooling levels. In running the simulations with parameter values as those deﬁned later, but with
B = 9, ¯ s = 0.1 then stagnation does not occur, but with B = 3 and ¯ s = 0.3 the economy will be caught
in a poverty trap even though in both cases B < 1
¯ s.
12transferred from period one to period two. Increasing the level of schooling will require
the individual to supply less labour in period one which will lower yt
t, but increase the
stock of human capital taken into the second period and subsequently increase yt
t+1.
The labour productivity eﬀect of health, for example At+1 = At(1 + g + θht), where
g ≥ 0 is technological change, and θ > 0, is not modelled here as this model is meant
as a baseline model of endogenous longevity and identifying health with a single role —
extending life expectancy — makes for a clear interpretation.
3.5 Budget Constraints
The individual is constrained by time and income. In the ﬁrst period, an individual
must divide their unit of time between labour supply (lt




t ≤ 1 − ¯ s − st (11)
In the ﬁrst period, income is divided between consumption and investment in health.












Non-satiation of expected utility in consumption and the assumption of no leisure imply
that the constraints in Equations (11), (12), and (13), hold with equality.
133.6 Problem of the Agent
Given that Equations (11) to (13) can be written as equalities, the problem of the utility







t(1 − ¯ s − st) − ht
¢











Subject to st ≥ 0; ht ≥ 0 (15)
Where corner solutions in health and schooling are feasible.
The Lagrangian is then expressed as
L(st,ht,λ,µ) =u(Ae
t
t(1 − ¯ s − st) − ht)
+ π(ht, ¯ z)u(ABe
t
t(¯ s + s
t
t)) + λst + µht (16)



















t) = πh(ht, ¯ z)u(c
t
t+1) + µ (18)
λst = 0; st ≥ 0; λ ≥ 0 (19)
µht = 0; ht ≥ 0; µ ≥ 0 (20)
The ﬁrst order conditions and Euler equations are used to conduct analysis as a closed
form solution cannot be deduced with this utility function which is not additively sepa-
rable. Threshold incomes at which schooling and health become positive, and the payoﬀ
between health and schooling are analysed in the following sections.
6As labour supply is normalised to one, then schooling investment which represents a proportion of
time is bound between zero and one, whereas investment in health is represented in the level and with
the non-negativity constraint then health is bound between zero and the level of ﬁrst period income.
143.7 Threshold Incomes for Strictly Positive
Investment in Schooling
Recalling that the utility function is expressed in a functional form with constant relative
risk aversion in consumption in Equation (2), the ﬁrst order condition in Equation (17)
can be expressed as,
π(ht, ¯ z)ABet
(ABet(st + ¯ s))γ + λ =
Aet
(Aet(1 − st − ¯ s) − ht)γ (21)
At the threshold level of income where an individual will switch from zero to positive
investment in schooling, the constraint on st in Equation (15) is binding and schooling




(Aet(1 − ¯ s) − ht)γ (22)
Rearranging this, the ﬁrst period income at which this switch from zero to positive
investment in schooling can be determined8,








This level of income represents the level of income required to encourage strictly positive
investment in schooling. Given that schooling investment is a risky investment, the
payoﬀ of higher second period consumption is not certain as survival through the second
period of life is probabilistic, then we expect that an individual with a higher degree of
risk aversion will require a higher threshold income at which investment in the risky asset
becomes strictly positive. This is indeed conﬁrmed by the simulation results presented
later in the chapter.
Given the term for risk aversion, γ, is in the exponent of Equation (23), taking the
7To satisfy the Kuhn Tucker conditions of constrained optimisation with inequalities, if the constraint
is binding so that it holds with an equality, in this case st = 0, then the multiplier, λ, must be ≥ 0.
When the constraint is not binding, and st > 0, then the multiplier must be zero, λ = 0. Hence at the
threshold where the constraint is binding with zero investment in schooling, and the indiﬀerence curve
associated with the expected utility function is tangent to the constraint at st = 0 and the multiplier
is also zero, λ = 0 (Simon and Blume, 1994).
8A corner solution in health is not assumed as this imposes zero investment in health when schooling
switches when indeed there is no reason for it not to be positive as the simulation results indicate.
15log of both sides and then taking the derivative with respect to γ gives,




γ2 ln{π(ht, ¯ z)B} (24)
This will be strictly positive, if π(ht, ¯ z) > 1
B and thus the level of income required before
schooling is strictly positive is increasing in the degree of risk aversion. This positive
relationship between the threshold ﬁrst period income and the degree of risk aversion
can be examined by looking at three cases,
Case 1: γ = 1, the highest degree of risk aversion in this model (log utility), the
threshold income is thus,




Case 2: γ ∈ (0,1) risk averse,








Case 3: γ = 0, risk neutral,




















which requires, π(ht, ¯ z) > 1
B as the derivative above also shows.
Thus, the level of income that is required at the threshold of an individual switching
from zero to positive investment in schooling is increasing in the degree of risk aversion.
Column 4 of Table of the simulation results presented in the Appendix on page 26
conﬁrms this. In the next chapter, we hold the degree of risk aversion constant, and
analyse changes in exogenous health and schooling.
163.8 Threshold Incomes for Strictly Positive
Investment in Health
Turning now to the ﬁrst order condition with respect to health, Equation (18), and
using the functional form of constant relative risk aversion in consumption, then the
ﬁrst order condition can be expressed as,
πh(ht, ¯ z)
(ABet(¯ s + st))1−γ
1 − γ
+ µ = (Aet(1 − ¯ s − st) − ht)
−γ (29)
Again, the income threshold at which investment in health switches from zero to positive,
health investment is zero, and the constraint on ht in Equation (15) is binding with
ht = 0, and µ is also zero. Using this condition and rearranging the level of income at
which investment in health switches from zero to positive is,
Aet(1 − ¯ s − st) = {
1 − γ
πh(0, ¯ z)(ABet(¯ s + st))1−γ}
1
γ (30)
Comparative static shows that,








< 0 if (1 − γ)πh(0, ¯ z)ABet(st + ¯ s) < 1
∂
∂γ
> 0 if (1 − γ)πh(0, ¯ z)ABet(st + ¯ s) > 1 (32)
Where ∂
∂γ > 0 implies that the income required before health investment is strictly
positive is increasing in the degree of risk aversion. Given the diﬀerent degrees of risk
aversion are expressed in terms of the value γ takes on, looking at three cases helps us
understand how attitudes towards health investment diﬀer according to the degree of
risk aversion.
Case 1: γ = 1, log utility and the highest degree of risk aversion in this study.
Aet(1 − ¯ s − st) =
1
πh(0, ¯ z)ln(ABet(st + ¯ s))
(33)
17Case 2: γ ∈ (0,1), the individual is risk averse.
Aet(1 − ¯ s − st) = {
1 − γ
πh(0, ¯ z)(ABet(¯ s + st))1−γ}
1
γ (34)
Case 3: γ = 0, the individual is risk neutral.
Aet(1 − ¯ s − st) = 0 if 1 − γ < πh(0, ¯ z)(ABet(¯ s + st))
= ∞ if 1 − γ > πh(0, ¯ z)(ABet(¯ s + st)) (35)
Looking at these three cases then we can see that the income required to encourage
strictly positive investment in health is increasing in the degree of risk aversion if 1−γ <
πh(0, ¯ z)(ABet(¯ s + st)) and γ ∈ [0,1). Simulation results presented later in the chapter
articulate this relationship as the threshold income is not clearly increasing or decreasing
in the degree of risk aversion is shown in Column 2 of Table in the Appendix, page 26
as the inequality condition in (35) does not hold with the chosen parameter values.
This analysis tells us the threshold levels of income required to switch to strictly
positive investment in health and/or schooling. The nature of the two types of invest-
ment are quite diﬀerent, both are costly in terms of forgoing ﬁrst period consumption,
but schooling has the eﬀect of increasing the value of period two consumption, while
health has the eﬀect of increasing the probability of achieving period two consumption.
3.9 Optimal Payoﬀ Between Health and Schooling
The Euler equations show the optimal payoﬀ between the two choice variables, schooling
and health. With a full interior solution, the ﬁrst order conditions can be written as,
wrt s:
π(ht, ¯ z)ABet
(ABet(st + ¯ s)γ =
Aet
(Aet(1 − st − ¯ s) − ht)γ (36)
wrt h:




(Aet(1 − st − ¯ s) − ht)γ (37)
Using these two ﬁrst order conditions, the Euler equation can be deduced as,
1 − γ





18Totally diﬀerentiating this Euler equation to determine the relationship between health
and schooling investment, we get,
−(1 − γ)Aet
(Aet(st + ¯ s))2ds =
πhh(ht, ¯ z)π(ht, ¯ z) − πh(ht, ¯ z)2
π(ht, ¯ z)2 dh (39)
Recalling the properties of the survival function, it can be seen that both sides are neg-
ative, indicating the health and schooling change in the same direction and thus shows
that the two investments are complements. Thus if education investment increases,
health investment will increase. If an individual is willing to bare the cost of investing
in education, they will also invest in health to increase the probability that they will live
to earn the returns on the investment in education. Similarly, if an individual invests
in health, thereby increasing their life expectancy, they have an improved incentive to
invest in education as the probability of living to enjoy the returns to education is now
higher.
3.10 Simulation Results
So far we have shown that from the ﬁrst order conditions the level of income required
to encourage strictly positive investment in schooling is increasing in the level of risk
aversion, and this is also the case for health investment under given parameter restric-
tions. Moreover, the Euler equation shows that investment in health and schooling are
complements. Simulation results are used to show the dynamic process and how invest-
ment decisions over health and schooling are made as human capital accumulates (and
therefore, as income accumulates) over the generations.
The following demonstrates the conditions required to determine which investment
comes ﬁrst as income increases with human capital accumulation (which is always pos-
sible even when voluntary investment in schooling is zero as there is an element of
compulsory schooling). In conducting the simulations, assumptions over parameter val-
ues, initial conditions, and the functional form of the survival function need to be made.
Given that the production functions are based on the paper by Blackburn and Cipri-
ani (2002), where possible, parameter values used by these authors are adopted in this
chapter. In this case, A = 1, B = 9, ¯ e = 0.1, π = 0.3 (minimum exogenous probability
19of survival), ¯ π = 0.95 (maximum probability of survival), Φ = 0.01. The choice of the
initial human capital stock parameter value, ¯ e = 0.1, is brought from Blackburn and
Cipriani (2002) and is this small value albeit greater than zero as we are attempting to
model an economy from the initial stages of development. If the initial human capital
stock is large, then the individual’s lifetime income would be beyond the thresholds re-
quired for positive investment in health and education. Hence with a high initial human
capital stock, we cannot analyse the payoﬀ between health and education investment,
and potential zero investment in either or both of these variables, as the individual be-
gins with a lifetime income where both investment will be strictly positive. In addition
to these parameter value assumptions, we assume, φ = 0.5, and compulsory schooling
is ¯ s = 0.3. The functional form of the survival function used in this chapter is also an
adaptation of Blackburn and Cipriani (2002). The functional form of the probability of
survival is,
π(ht, ¯ z) =
π + ¯ πΦ(ht)φ
1 + Φ(ht)φ (40)
With these parameter values, simulations are run over ﬁfty generations. Income ac-
cumulates each successive generation according to the equation for human capital in
Equation (4), and with B > 1
¯ s, the condition for endogenous growth is satisﬁed (ac-
cording to requirements for exponential accumulation in Equation (9)) even without
voluntary investment in schooling. Hence, with the above chosen parameter values, a
poverty trap is not a threat (B = 9 > 1
¯ s = 10
3 ). In conducting the simulations, diﬀerent
levels of risk aversion are assumed, γ = [0,0.1,0.2,...,0.9], and each time the simula-
tions are run, the generation in which health and schooling become strictly positive is
observed, and the associated level of ﬁrst period income and expected lifetime utility
are also noted. The ordering of these investments diﬀers as the degree of risk aversion
changes, so too does the level of income required to encourage investment in either
health or schooling.
Figure 1 on page 27 illustrates that the proportion of time invested in schooling
decreases as risk aversion increases. At low levels of risk aversion, (γ → 0), an individual
will invest strongly in schooling thereby taking resources from ﬁrst period income and
then earn a skilled wage in the second period. This decision to invest in the risky asset
(second period consumption) stems from the fact that a risk neutral individual (where
γ = 0) will base their decisions under uncertainty on expected value, and for a risk
20neutral individual expected value and expected utility are the same.
Not only is the rate of investment in schooling decreasing in the degree of risk
aversion, but the generation at which this investment initially occurs is increasing in the
degree of risk aversion. This is representative of the fact that the higher the degree of
risk aversion, the greater the ﬁrst period income must be before an individual is willing
to switch from zero to strictly positive investment in schooling.
Figure 2 shows the level of health investment is decreasing in the degree of risk aver-
sion. Health investment has the eﬀect of increasing life expectancy, thereby increasing
the probability of achieving second period income. But as an individual becomes more
risk averse, their willingness to invest in health will decline, for as with schooling returns,
health investment will not be enjoyed if the individual dies at the end of the ﬁrst period.
The willingness of the individual to invest in health and schooling can be thought
of in a risk analysis setting. Individuals who are risk averse will base their decisions on
expected utility, not expected value as a risk neutral person would, and to encourage an
individual to take a gamble then they must be awarded an appropriate risk premium
(an amount the individual receives with certainty when taking the gamble) to do so.
Comparing two degrees of risk aversion, say high and low, an individual with a high
degree of risk aversion will require a higher risk premium for the same gamble as an
individual with a lower degree of risk aversion. Alternatively, we can interpret this
comparison as for a given initial income an individual with the higher degree of risk
aversion will gamble less than the individual with a lower degree or risk aversion. So,
for a given level of income, the amount an individual is willing to gamble falls as the
degree or risk aversion increases. This results is observed in the simulation results
presented in Figures 1 and 2.
Table in page 26 shows that as the degree of risk aversion increases so too does the
threshold level of income required before an individual will switch to strictly positive
investment in schooling. With the degree of risk aversion γ ∈ [0,0.2] schooling and
health investment switch to strictly positive simultaneously at the beginning of the ﬁrst
generation. With mid levels of risk aversion, γ ∈ [0.3,0.7], investment in schooling
precedes investment in health. For example with γ = 0.6 schooling investment occurs
from the ﬁrst generation, but health investment does not switch to strictly positive
21until the forth generation. At high degrees of risk aversion, γ ∈ [0.8,1.0], investment
in schooling occurs after investment in health, as an example when, γ = 0.8 initial
investment in health occurs at the third generation but investment in schooling does
not commence until the 11th generation. The ordering of the investments depends on
the return each investment oﬀers at diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion.
The ordering of the investments changes as the degree of risk aversion changes be-
cause each investment plays a diﬀerent role in decision making under uncertainty. In-
vestment in schooling has the eﬀect of increasing the expected value of the risky asset,
and investment in health increases the probability of achieving the risky asset. When
risk aversion is high, an individual will invest in health ﬁrst, increasing the probability
of achieving the risky asset, before they take the gamble on the risky asset by investing
in schooling.
4 Conclusion
Prior to this paper, models of endogenous longevity did not explore the dynamic rela-
tionship between investment in health, life expectancy, schooling and economic growth.
Using a two period overlapping generations model where both schooling and health in-
vestment are choice variables of the individual, interactions between health and schooling
can be analysed more thoroughly than in models of exogenous longevity. Both health
and schooling are costly in terms of forgone ﬁrst period consumption, but the payoﬀs are
diﬀerent for each investment. Schooling investment has the eﬀect of increasing the return
to labour in the second period thus increasing second period consumption. However,
the individual only lives through the second period probabilistically and this probability
is determined by the level of investment in health. Investment in schooling is thus risky,
and health investment has the eﬀect of increasing the probability of achieving the payoﬀ
for this risky investment in schooling.
In further exploring the relationship between health and schooling and their eﬀects
on economic growth, the ﬁrst order conditions reveal that threshold levels of income exist
where schooling and health switch to strictly positive levels. For schooling investment,
the threshold level of income is increasing the the degree of risk aversion. As risk
22aversion increases the individual must secure a higher income with certainty before they
are willing to take the gamble of investing in schooling. The threshold income for health
investment does not monotonically increase with the degree of risk aversion.
The Euler equations show that health and schooling investments are complements. In
this model there is no quality/quantity trade oﬀ of length of life and higher consumption.
The two investments move together.
The ﬁrst order conditions show that thresholds exist, but we are not able to decipher
from these alone when investment in health and schooling occur relative to the other as
income accumulates. Simulation results show that when the degree of risk aversion is low
then the individual will invest in schooling ﬁrst and then as income further accumulates,
they invest in health. For individuals who are more risk averse, they will invest in health
ﬁrst to increase the probability of achieving the risky asset before investing in schooling.
The key contribution of this model of endogenous life expectancy over other mod-
els of exogenous life expectancy is to show that the relationship between health and
schooling is highly interactive and depends on the degree of risk aversion. The pol-
icy prescription of increasing life expectancy to boost economic growth does not hold
when considering the endogeneity of both health and schooling as it does in models
of exogenous longevity. Encouraging individuals to devote resources to increase in life
expectancy may be suboptimal when income levels are low. The next chapter explores
the economic growth eﬀects of schooling and health programs in more detail.
235 Appendices
Chakraborty (2004) asserts that using his speciﬁed Equations (1), (2) and (6) it can be
shown that diﬀerences in productivity, A, lead to diﬀerences in the capital to output
ratio, because for any given capital stock, a lower A will reduce longevity through lower
income and health investment. The endogeneity of life expectancy is implied through
a chosen health tax, τt. But it is not the endogeneity of life expectancy that is driving
diﬀerences in productivity as Proposition 1 of Chakraborty (2004) claims.
From Equation (1) in Chakraborty (2004):
φt = φ(ht) (41)
From Equation (2) in Chakraborty (2004):
(ht) = g (τt,wt) = τtwt (42)
From Equation (6) in Chakraborty (2004):
wt = w(kt) = (1 − α)Ak
α
t (43)
To identify the relationship between productivity and life expectancy from these three













These ﬁrst derivatives show that if productivity falls, the wage rate will fall, which
in turn lowers health and life expectancy. Diﬀerences in life expectancy implied by a
change in productivity are generated by changes in the wage rate, not a variable health
tax rate. It is not the endogeneity of the health tax that is driving this relationship
24between productivity and life expectancy as asserted by Chakraborty (2004, p. 126),
rather the proposition can be achieved with either endogenous or exogenous health tax.
25Table 1: Threshold incomes, expected utility and generation at which investment





t Gen. th Gen. ts
0 0.003 0.265 0.003 0.265 1 1
0.1 0.003 0.301 0.003 0.301 1 1
0.2 0.006 0.349 0.006 0.349 1 1
0.3 0.194 1.818 0.025 0.433 2 1
0.4 1.395 4.739 0.043 0.587 3 1
0.5 1.180 3.941 0.055 0.851 3 1
0.6 3.298 6.383 0.063 1.310 4 1
0.7 2.297 6.230 0.069 2.176 4 1
0.8 0.769 6.609 2256.284 35.273 3 11
0.9 0.259 11.736 114696.807 58.281 2 15
1 5.867 2.706 319065.732 23.571 5 16
γ degree of risk aversion; yh
t threshold level of ﬁrst period income where investment in health becomes
positive; ys
t threshold level of ﬁrst period income when investment in schooling becomes positive; Uh
t
expected lifetime utility when health switches to strictly positive; Us
t expected lifetime utility when
schooling switches to strictly positive; Gen. th generation when investment in health switches to
strictly positive; Gen. ts generation when investment in schooling switches to strictly positive.
.
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Graphics of simulation results generated by Jocelyn Finlay using Gauss










































Degree of Risk Aversion
Graphics of simulation results generated by Jocelyn Finlay using Gauss
27References
Blackburn, K. and Cipriani, G. P. (2002). A model of longevity, fertility and growth.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26(2):187–204.
Boucekkine, R., del Riob, F., and Licandro, O. (1999). Endogenous vs exogenously
driven ﬂuctuations in vintage capital models. Journal of Economic Theory, 88(1):161–
187.
Chakraborty, S. (2004). Endogenous lifetime and economic growth. Journal of Economic
Theory, 116:119–137.
Chakraborty, S. and Das, M. (2005). Mortality, fertility and child labour. Economics
Letters, 86(2):273–278.
de la Croix, D. and Licandro, O. (1999). Life expectancy and endogenous growth.
Economic Letters, 65:255–263.
Ehrlich, I. and Chuma, H. (1990). A model of the demand for longevity and the value
of life extenstion. The Journal of Political Economy, 98(4):761–782.
Ehrlich, I. and Lui, F. (1997). The problem of population and growth: A review of
the literature from malthus to contemporary models of endogenous population and
endogenous growth. Journal of Dynamics and Control, 21(1):205–242.
Grossman, M. (1972). On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. The
Journal of Political Economy, 80(2):223–255.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S. (2002). Does the mortality decline promote economic growth? Jour-
nal of Economic Growth, 7:411–439.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Ryder, H. E., and Weil, D. N. (2000). Mortality decline, human capi-
tal investment, and economic growth. Journal of Development Economics, 62(1):1–23.
Rosenzweig, M. R. (1990). Population growth and human capital investments: Theory
and evidence. The Journal of Political Economy, 98(5.2):S38–S70.
Simon, C. P. and Blume, L. (1994). Mathematics for Economists. W.W. Norton and
Company.
Zhang, J., Zhang, J., and Lee, R. (2001). Mortality decline and long-run economic
growth. Journal of Public Economics, 80(3):485–507.
28